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Abstract 
Virtualization technologies have proven to be important drivers for the fast and cost-efficient development and deployment of 
services. While the benefits are tremendous, there are many challenges to be faced when developing or porting services to 
virtualized infrastructure. Especially critical applications like Virtualized Network Functions must meet high requirements in terms 
of reliability and resilience. An important tool when meeting such requirements is detecting anomalous system components and 
recovering the anomaly before it turns into a fault and subsequently into a failure visible to the client. 
Anomaly detection for virtualized services relies on collecting system metrics that represent the normal operation state of every 
component and allow the usage of machine learning algorithms to automatically build models representing such state. This paper 
presents an approach for collecting service-layer metrics while treating services as black-boxes. This allows service providers to 
implement anomaly detection on the application layer without the need to modify third-party software. Deep Packet Inspection is 
used to analyse the traffic of virtual machines on the hypervisor layer, producing both generic and protocol-specific 
communication metrics. An evaluation shows that the resulting metrics represent the normal operation state of an example 
Virtualized Network Function and are therefore a valuable contribution to automatic anomaly detection in virtualized services. 
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1. Introduction 
As the number of services running on virtualized infrastructure continues to increase, even critical applications 
from the telecommunication sector are ported from traditional appliances onto cloud deployments.  
Driven by high customer expectations, such critical services have an especially high demand for reliability and 
continuous service delivery. 
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1. Introduction 
As the number of services running on virtualized infrastructure continues to increase, even critical applications 
from the telecommunication sector are ported from traditional appliances onto cloud deployments.  
Driven by high customer expectations, such critical services have an especially high demand for reliability and 
continuous service delivery. 
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Traditional reactive fault management is not sufficient to guarantee a constantly high service availability. Cost 
effective private and public clouds rely on commodity hardware which cannot guarantee failover latencies short 
enough to hide faults from clients. 
Since anomalies often precede faults, anomaly detection mechanisms provide an early warning system that enables 
proactive fault management1. Anomaly detection can operate across all layers of the cloud system by collecting 
various operative time series metrics. Unsupervised machine learning techniques analyse the collected data to detect 
abnormal patterns and outliers. 
The anomaly detection accuracy mainly depends on the input data used to build the underlying machine learning 
models. In the context of virtualized services, many indicators for normal operation can be found in resource usage 
data like the utilization of CPU, memory, network and disk. This data is available on all system layers and does not 
require specific knowledge about the monitored service. Treating services as black boxes makes this anomaly 
detection approach easily usable in arbitrary productive environments. Furthermore, it allows Infrastructure-as-a-
Service (IaaS) providers to offer an anomaly detection service to customers while maintaining minimal interference 
with customer machines. 
However, mere resource usage fails to accurately reflect the communication patterns of the observed services and 
therefore does not cover all potential anomalies. This paper presents a mechanism for collecting service 
communication metrics while still remaining largely service agnostic, as long as the services rely on standardized 
application layer protocols. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) on the hypervisor level allows real-time analysis of the 
inter-service communication with low interference. Services do not need to be customized or extended to obtain this 
information, but knowledge about the used protocols can reduce the performance overhead of packet inspection. The 
second contribution of this paper is an evaluation of the presented data collection mechanism. We show that a 
number of simulated anomalies manifest themselves in the resulting metrics. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents related research in the field of 
deep package inspection and anomaly detection. Section 3 describes the presented approach in detail, while section 4 
presents an evaluation thereof. 
2. Related Work 
Much related work has been conducted in the field of deep package inspection and automated protocol analysis. 
M. Danelutto et al. show in their work2 how package inspection is possible on commodity server hardware using a 
skeleton-based parallel programming library targeting efficient streaming on multi-core architectures. Using their 
framework the authors show that package inspection for packets with 60 byte payloads can be performed with a 
commodity Intel 10 Gbit network card. 
Anat Bremler-Barr et al. identify DPI as a common task for middleboxes that inspect application layer packets 
many times during their route from sender to the final destination3. Since most middleboxes perform similar 
analyses to implement traffic control and QoS measurements, the authors propose a DPI-as-a-service infrastructure 
to reduce the total overhead of repeated packet inspection. The proposed infrastructure can lead to improved 
performance, scalability and robustness, showing that DPI has become mature and fast enough to be executed even 
as a standalone service. 
Further research shows that the application layer protocol used by packets can be identified in real-time using 
DPI4,5,6. 
3. Approach 
An exemplary infrastructure illustrates the proposed data collection approach and follows a typical cloud deployment 
used both by IaaS providers and in private clouds hosting Virtualized Network Function services. The services run on 
virtualized hardware and network resources provided by the cloud operating system OpenStack7 and complementary 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) components. Open vSwitch8 manages the virtual network connecting all VMs.  
Figure 1 shows the basic structure of the network architecture inside a physical compute node managed by 
OpenStack. It illustrates two virtual machines within one hypervisor connected to various Open vSwitch bridges. A 
dedicated monitoring agent implements the data collection by sniffing packets on the tap interface of every relevant 
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Traditional reactive fault management is not sufficient to guarantee a constantly high service availability. Cost 
effective private and public clouds rely on commodity hardware which cannot guarantee failover latencies short 
enough to hide faults from clients. 
Since anomalies often precede faults, anomaly detection mechanisms provide an early warning system that enables 
proactive fault management1. Anomaly detection can operate across all layers of the cloud system by collecting 
various operative time series metrics. Unsupervised machine learning techniques analyse the collected data to detect 
abnormal patterns and outliers. 
The anomaly detection accuracy mainly depends on the input data used to build the underlying machine learning 
models. In the context of virtualized services, many indicators for normal operation can be found in resource usage 
data like the utilization of CPU, memory, network and disk. This data is available on all system layers and does not 
require specific knowledge about the monitored service. Treating services as black boxes makes this anomaly 
detection approach easily usable in arbitrary productive environments. Furthermore, it allows Infrastructure-as-a-
Service (IaaS) providers to offer an anomaly detection service to customers while maintaining minimal interference 
with customer machines. 
However, mere resource usage fails to accurately reflect the communication patterns of the observed services and 
therefore does not cover all potential anomalies. This paper presents a mechanism for collecting service 
communication metrics while still remaining largely service agnostic, as long as the services rely on standardized 
application layer protocols. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) on the hypervisor level allows real-time analysis of the 
inter-service communication with low interference. Services do not need to be customized or extended to obtain this 
information, but knowledge about the used protocols can reduce the performance overhead of packet inspection. The 
second contribution of this paper is an evaluation of the presented data collection mechanism. We show that a 
number of simulated anomalies manifest themselves in the resulting metrics. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents related research in the field of 
deep package inspection and anomaly detection. Section 3 describes the presented approach in detail, while section 4 
presents an evaluation thereof. 
2. Related Work 
Much related work has been conducted in the field of deep package inspection and automated protocol analysis. 
M. Danelutto et al. show in their work2 how package inspection is possible on commodity server hardware using a 
skeleton-based parallel programming library targeting efficient streaming on multi-core architectures. Using their 
framework the authors show that package inspection for packets with 60 byte payloads can be performed with a 
commodity Intel 10 Gbit network card. 
Anat Bremler-Barr et al. identify DPI as a common task for middleboxes that inspect application layer packets 
many times during their route from sender to the final destination3. Since most middleboxes perform similar 
analyses to implement traffic control and QoS measurements, the authors propose a DPI-as-a-service infrastructure 
to reduce the total overhead of repeated packet inspection. The proposed infrastructure can lead to improved 
performance, scalability and robustness, showing that DPI has become mature and fast enough to be executed even 
as a standalone service. 
Further research shows that the application layer protocol used by packets can be identified in real-time using 
DPI4,5,6. 
3. Approach 
An exemplary infrastructure illustrates the proposed data collection approach and follows a typical cloud deployment 
used both by IaaS providers and in private clouds hosting Virtualized Network Function services. The services run on 
virtualized hardware and network resources provided by the cloud operating system OpenStack7 and complementary 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) components. Open vSwitch8 manages the virtual network connecting all VMs.  
Figure 1 shows the basic structure of the network architecture inside a physical compute node managed by 
OpenStack. It illustrates two virtual machines within one hypervisor connected to various Open vSwitch bridges. A 
dedicated monitoring agent implements the data collection by sniffing packets on the tap interface of every relevant 
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virtual machine. The tap interface transfers every packet received and sent by the virtual machine, after being filtered 
by the Security Groups mechanism of OpenStack. Security Groups implement a simple rule-based firewall managed 
by the owner of the virtual machine. Malicious or unintended packets are dropped at this point, resulting in increased 
anomaly detection precision when analysing packets on the tap interface. Detecting malicious activities is not the 
focus of application-layer anomaly detection, and is left for dedicated Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). 
 
 
Figure 1: Hypervisor Structure 
The data collection agent analyses the observed traffic and extracts metrics that are specific to different Layer 7 
protocols. The used protocols can be inferred in real-time4,5,6, but the performance overhead can optionally be reduced 
when this information is provided by the user. This knowledge allows an additional optimization which is to only 
analyse traffic on specified ports that belong to relevant application layer protocols. In a well-configured OpenStack 
environment, such information can be obtained by analysing all security groups, since they explicitly whitelist all 
connections expected between service instances. 
For every relevant application layer protocol, the data collection agent counts the occurrence of specific messages 
and reports how often each class of messages is observed in a configurable time interval. The message classes 
depend on the specific protocol and in order to maintain an appropriate number of metrics, some message classes 
have to be grouped into one. HTTP communication, for example, consists of requests and responses, where the 
response can contain one of dozens standardized status codes. Instead of counting every code individually, the codes 
are grouped by their first digit: 1xx, 2xx, 3xx, and so on. This results in 5 metrics that provide a good approximation 
of the operation of an HTTP server. A simliar grouping mechanism is used to track the Session Initiation Protocol 
(SIP)9. In addition to protocol specific metrics, the data collection agent provides generic information for every 
observed port, like the number of transmitted packets and bytes. 
Table 1 gives an overview over the metrics obtained from the SIP protocol. The SIP-protocol is use commonly in 
IP-telephony such as VoIP. SIP controls the multimedia sessions and handles creation, termination and modification 
of media streams such as voice-connections. It is a text-based protocol using elements of Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP). The data collection agent is written in Python using the scapy library*. The collected statistics are 





 Marcel Wallschläger, Anton Gulenko, Florian Schmidt, Odej Kao, Feng Liu / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2015) 000–000 4 
Table 1: abstracted features from SIP protocol handler 
Feature Names Description 
Overall packets 
Registrations 
Return code 1xx 
Number of Packets 
Registration requests 
Indicates the request was valid and is being processed 
Return code 2xx Indicates successful completion  
Return code 3xx 
Return code 4xx 
Return code 5xx 
Return code 6xx 
Indicates a redirection is needed 
Indicates bad syntax or cannot be fulfilled 
Indicates server failure in processing request 
Indicates global failure 
4. Evaluation 
An evaluation inside a dedicated private cloud testbed demonstrates that a selected set of anomalies can be observed 
in the metrics produced by the proposed data collection approach. The testbed is based on OpenStack Kilo and runs 
Open vSwitch in version 2.41. The setup simulates an IaaS provider hosting customer services on five hypervisors 
and one OpenStack controller node, which is also running the OpenStack networking service. 
The client service is Project Clearwater10, an open source implementation of the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). 
An IMS service uses the SIP protocol to establish sessions between clients. Figure 2 shows the architecture of Project 
Clearwater. The red box highlights the SIP communication channel between the two core components called Bono 
and Sprout. The data collection agent monitors the SIP communication on this connection. The Bono node acts as a 
client-facing SIP proxy, while Sprout implements the core IMS functionality. To fulfill its role, Sprout needs a working 
connection to Homestead to obtain information about registered clients.† 
The SIP benchmarking client sip-stress‡ continuously exchanges SIP messages with the Bono node, which also leads 








Figure 2: Excerpt of the Project Clearwater Architecture including connection protocols 
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virtual machine. The tap interface transfers every packet received and sent by the virtual machine, after being filtered 
by the Security Groups mechanism of OpenStack. Security Groups implement a simple rule-based firewall managed 
by the owner of the virtual machine. Malicious or unintended packets are dropped at this point, resulting in increased 
anomaly detection precision when analysing packets on the tap interface. Detecting malicious activities is not the 
focus of application-layer anomaly detection, and is left for dedicated Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). 
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(SIP)9. In addition to protocol specific metrics, the data collection agent provides generic information for every 
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Protocol (HTTP). The data collection agent is written in Python using the scapy library*. The collected statistics are 
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Open vSwitch in version 2.41. The setup simulates an IaaS provider hosting customer services on five hypervisors 
and one OpenStack controller node, which is also running the OpenStack networking service. 
The client service is Project Clearwater10, an open source implementation of the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). 
An IMS service uses the SIP protocol to establish sessions between clients. Figure 2 shows the architecture of Project 
Clearwater. The red box highlights the SIP communication channel between the two core components called Bono 
and Sprout. The data collection agent monitors the SIP communication on this connection. The Bono node acts as a 
client-facing SIP proxy, while Sprout implements the core IMS functionality. To fulfill its role, Sprout needs a working 
connection to Homestead to obtain information about registered clients.† 
The SIP benchmarking client sip-stress‡ continuously exchanges SIP messages with the Bono node, which also leads 
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Two anomalies are injected into the running system to test the reaction of the collected metrics: 
1. Increasing the network latency of the virtualized NIC of the Sprout VM by 150ms. This anomaly represents 
a degraded state of a network component which does not result in system crashes but reduces the performance 
of the system. 
2. Stopping the Homestead service running on a separate virtual machine. This anomaly affects the entire 
Clearwater installation, since client registrations are not possible anymore. Therefore, the anomaly propagates 
to the Sprout and Bono component, and finally to the client of the system. 
 
One evaluation experiment consists of two steps. First, the data collection agent records data during normal system 
operation for one minute. Afterwards, one of the above anomalies is injected and the system state is observed for 
another minute, before reverting the anomaly. This procedure is repeated ten times. 
Figure 3a shows two box plots summarizing all measurements of the number of registrations per second with and 
without the increased latency anomaly. The amount of registrations per second is reduced while the anomaly is active. 
Figure 4a shows the development of the registrations per second metric within one exemplary evaluation run.  
Figure 3b shows the number of success return messages during normal operation and after stopping the Homestead 
service. Since the Clearwater is unable to correctly process client authentication requests, the number of success 
messages rapidly drops to zero. Figure 4b shows the successful return messages during one run of the experiment. 
This evaluation suggests that the selected anomalies are manifested in the metrics produced by the proposed data 
collection technique. The resulting metrics are therefore valuable input features for anomaly detection mechanisms in 
practice. 
Figure 3a: Registrations per second, increased latency 
Figure 4a: Registrations per second, increased latency (one run) Figure 4b: Success messages per second, Homestead service stopped (one run) 
Figure 3b: Success messages per second, Homestead service stopped 
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5. Conclusion 
This work presents an approach for collecting metrics about the operation of virtualized services with minimal 
interference. This allows IaaS service providers to offer anomaly detection as a service to their clients, as well as 
generic anomaly detection mechanisms in private clouds. The presented approach is evaluated by injecting 
anomalies in a dedicated cloud testbed. 
Future work on this topic includes further evaluations of DPI based metric collection in combination with online 
anomaly detection approaches. Handling more application layer protocols will extend the approach to a wider range 
of virtualized services. An extended evaluation in a fully loaded 10Gbit network on commodity hardware will 
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Two anomalies are injected into the running system to test the reaction of the collected metrics: 
1. Increasing the network latency of the virtualized NIC of the Sprout VM by 150ms. This anomaly represents 
a degraded state of a network component which does not result in system crashes but reduces the performance 
of the system. 
2. Stopping the Homestead service running on a separate virtual machine. This anomaly affects the entire 
Clearwater installation, since client registrations are not possible anymore. Therefore, the anomaly propagates 
to the Sprout and Bono component, and finally to the client of the system. 
 
One evaluation experiment consists of two steps. First, the data collection agent records data during normal system 
operation for one minute. Afterwards, one of the above anomalies is injected and the system state is observed for 
another minute, before reverting the anomaly. This procedure is repeated ten times. 
Figure 3a shows two box plots summarizing all measurements of the number of registrations per second with and 
without the increased latency anomaly. The amount of registrations per second is reduced while the anomaly is active. 
Figure 4a shows the development of the registrations per second metric within one exemplary evaluation run.  
Figure 3b shows the number of success return messages during normal operation and after stopping the Homestead 
service. Since the Clearwater is unable to correctly process client authentication requests, the number of success 
messages rapidly drops to zero. Figure 4b shows the successful return messages during one run of the experiment. 
This evaluation suggests that the selected anomalies are manifested in the metrics produced by the proposed data 
collection technique. The resulting metrics are therefore valuable input features for anomaly detection mechanisms in 
practice. 
Figure 3a: Registrations per second, increased latency 
Figure 4a: Registrations per second, increased latency (one run) Figure 4b: Success messages per second, Homestead service stopped (one run) 
Figure 3b: Success messages per second, Homestead service stopped 
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5. Conclusion 
This work presents an approach for collecting metrics about the operation of virtualized services with minimal 
interference. This allows IaaS service providers to offer anomaly detection as a service to their clients, as well as 
generic anomaly detection mechanisms in private clouds. The presented approach is evaluated by injecting 
anomalies in a dedicated cloud testbed. 
Future work on this topic includes further evaluations of DPI based metric collection in combination with online 
anomaly detection approaches. Handling more application layer protocols will extend the approach to a wider range 
of virtualized services. An extended evaluation in a fully loaded 10Gbit network on commodity hardware will 
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